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once noted: "Respect for the law is furthered when the individual knows
his position and is not left suspicious that a later prosecution was actually
the fruit of his compelled testimony." 65
CHARLEs LIT-ELL

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS DISPUTES: A WUNDERLICHING
FOR JUSTICE AND THE GAO
S &E Contractors,Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1 (1972)
Pursuant to the disputes clause of the contract the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) reviewed plaintiff-contractor's claim for additional compensation and allowed recovery.' The Commission subsequently refused to pay
its own award after the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued an opinion
declaring recovery improper. 2 Plaintiff sued in the Court of Claims challenging GAO's intervention and seeking enforcement of the original AEC
decision. 3 A divided Court of Claims sustained GAO's intervention and
upheld the AEC's refusal to pay.4 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed
and HELD, that the AEC possessed exclusive administrative authority under
the contract's disputes clause to resolve the claim and that, absent fraud,
neither the GAO nor the Department of Justice had the right to review or to
appeal the AEC decision. 5
65. Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 552 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Piccirillo
raised the issue confronted in the instant case but the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Justice Brennan, who took no part in the instant case,
dissented and reached the merits in an opinion that clearly indicates he favors retention
of the transactional immunity standard in intrajurisdictional immunity.
I. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 9-10, S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406
U.S. 1 (1972). Nine distinct claims totaling approximately $1,950,000 were presented to
the Commission, of which eight were sustained.
2. 406 U.S. at 6. The General Accounting Office [hereinafter cited as GAO] initially
entered the dispute at the instance of a certifying officer within the Atomic Energy Commission [hereinafter cited as AEC]. This officer requested the Comptroller General's opinion
regarding the legality of a $32,297.75 award made to S & E by the original hearing
examiner and therefore not appealed to the Commission. GAO felt that the validity of
the award hinged on the AEC's decision regarding the nine claims appealed and thus
proceeded to review the entire dispute. Its opinion is listed as 46 Comp. Gen. 441 (1966).
See also Brief for the United States at 41-43 (app.), S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United
States, 406 U.S. 1 (1972).
3. Id. at 6-7.
4. S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 433 F.2d 1173 (Ct. Cl. 1970). The division
was 4-3 with the dissenters filing two separate opinions.
5. 406 U.S. 1 (1972). Whether the AEC on its own initiative might have repudiated
its previous award and thus secured judicial review by forcing the contractor to bring suit
for enforcement of the initial decision is a question unanswered by the Court. See text
accompanying notes 49-54 infra.
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The mandatory6 standard form disputes clause7 a prototype of which
was contained in the instant contract,8 serves a dual purpose in the administration of government contracts. Its primary function is to ensure that the
Government will not be prevented from obtaining essential items by a
subsequent dispute under the contract. 9 To this end the clause curtails the
contractor's common law right to stop work in the event of a dispute by requiring him to continue performance at his own expense in the manner prescribed by the government contracting officer.'1
In addition, the clause provides an efficient and economical administrative procedure to resolve any dispute subsequently "arising under" the
contract.' In practice, this procedure embodies three distinct phases, 12 the

6. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. 9-7.5004-03 (1972).
7. The disputes clause currently in general use provides: "(a) Except as otherwise
provided in this contract, any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under this
contract which is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by the Contracting Officer,
who shall reduce his decision to writing. The decision of the Contracting Officer shall be
final and conclusive unless, within 30 days from the date of receipt of such copy, the
Contractor mails or otherwise furnishes to the Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed
to the head of the agency involved. The decision of the head of the agency or his duly
authorized representative for the determination of such appeals shall be final and conclusive. This provision shall not be pleaded in any suit involving a question of fact
arising under this contract as limiting judicial review of any such decision to cases
where fraud by such official or his representative or board is alleged. Provided, however,
that any such decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same is fraudulent or ca-

pricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith or is not
supported by substantial evidence. In connection with any appeal proceedings under this

clause, the Contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in
support of his appeal. Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall
proceed diligently with the performance of the contract and in accordance with the
Contracting Officer's decision.
"(b) This disputes clause does not preclude consideration of questions of law in connection with decisions provided for in paragraph (a) above. Nothing in this contract,
however, shall be construed as making final the decision of any administrative official,
representative, or board on a question of law." 32 C.F.R. §7.602-6 (1971) (emphasis added).
8. The disputes clause in the instant contract differed slightly from the italicized
language of note 7 supra. 406 U.S. at 3-4 n.2. However, the difference does not appear to
be of substantive significance. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 50-51.
9. R. NAsH & J. CmINIC, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAWS 848, 858 (1969).
10.
11.

COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, GOVERNMENT CONTRAaTs GUME 619 (1969).
Spector, Public Contract Claims Procedures-A Perspective, 30 FED. B.J. 1, 6 (1971).

The "arising under" limitation serves to except those claims constituting a breach of
contract from the application of the disputes clause procedure. For a concise treatment of
the differences between breach of contract claims and those cognizable under the disputes
procedure, see PL NASH & J. Cmraic, supra note 9, at 857-69.
12. Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 29
LAw & Co-rmeP. PROaB. 39 (1964). The first phase involves the effort to negotiate a
settlement between the contractor and the government contracting officer. Phase two entails the rendering of a written decision by the contracting officer after attempts at
settlement have failed. This decision then becomes final and binding on both parties
unless the contractor submits a written appeal to the head of the contracting agency within
30 days after receipt of the contracting officer's decision. The third phase is the hearing
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last of which requires a final decision by the head of the government agency
involved or that of his specially designated board of contract appeals. In the
instant case the contractor followed the prescribed procedure obtaining
a favorable decision from the AEC sitting as its own board of contract
appeals. 13
By restoring finality to the decision of the AEC, the instant Court acceded
to a long-standing tradition that began in 1878 with Kihlberg v. United
States.'4 In Kihlberg the contract provided that a designated government
official would be the arbiter of any ensuing disputes between the parties. The
contractor nevertheless challenged this official's subsequent resolution of a
particular dispute. On review the Supreme Court upheld the contractual
delegation of authority to the government official and decreed that his decision was to be accorded finality in the courts absent evidence of fraud or
bad faith. 15
Several Court of Claims decisions in the 1940's purported to restrict the
Kihlberg rule by allowing judicial review where dispute determinations were
deemed to be so clearly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith.16 However, in 1950 the Supreme Court reinforced the finality rule by holding in
United States v. Moorman:7 that decisions rendered under the disputes clause
in government contracts were to be final on questions of law as well as on
questions of fact. A year later the Court conclusively reversed the restrictive
efforts of the Court of Claims by holding in United States v. Wunderlich's
that administrative dispute determinations could only be reversed in the
courts on proof of fraud or bad faith.
The Moorman and Wunderlich decisions produced concern among government contractors' 9 as well as certain government agencies 20 over the broad
powers accorded government administrators under the disputes resolution
process. Congress responded to this concern in 1954 by passing the Wunderlich Act 2' to counter the effects of these two decisions by expanding the

and final determination of the appeal by the agency head or his designated board of
contract appeals. See text of the disputes clause supra note 7.
13. 406 U.S. at 5-6.
14. 97 U.S. 398 (1878).
15. Id. at 401.
16. See, e.g., Needles v. United States, 101 Ct. C1. 535, 604 (1944), holding that the
absence of any substantial evidence in support of a disputes decision would justify an
inference of bad faith upon which the court could reverse the administrative determination;
Bein v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 144, 167 (1943), holding the court could reverse the
contracting officer's decision where no substantial evidence existed to support it.
17. 338 U.S. 457 (1950). The clause in the Moorman contract was, however, an "all
disputes" clause conferring authority on the contracting officer to decide both issues of
law and issues of fact.
18. 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
19. 406 U.S. 1, 69-90 (1972) (app.).
20. GAO was the primary government agency expressing concern over the "uncontrolled discretion over the Government's contractual affairs" accorded contracting officers
by the two decisions. Id. app. at 69.
21. 41 U.S.C. §§321-22 (1970).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1973

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 12
1973]

CASE COMMENTS

grounds upon which contractors could seek judicial review of adverse disputes decisions. 22 However, whether Congress also intended to expand the
government's right to seek judicial review of these same decisions was un24
clear,2 and conflicting official interpretations followed.
In holding that the Wunderlich Act precluded GAO and the Department
of Justice from initiating appeals from administrative disputes determinations, 2 5 the instant Court continued to give the Act the restrictive interpretation begun in United States v. Carlo Bianchi Sc Co. 26 In Bianchi the Court
had held that the expanded grounds for judicial review created by the Act
did not entitle an appealing contractor to a trial de novo in the Court of
Claims, thus confining the reviewing Court's examination to the contents
of the administrative record. 27 Coupled with two subsequent decisions reinforcing its holding,28 Bianchi thus did much to restore the finality to disputes
decisions in the Government's favor that the Wunderlich Act had attempted
to preclude. By restricting the Government's right of appeal, the instant decision further abets that restoration and likewise produces greater administrative autonomy over the government contracting process.
Another significant impact of the instant decision is the restriction it
places on the role of the GAO in the government procurement process. 29 On
the strength of its general authority to settle and adjust both claims against
the Government and accounts in which the Government is concerned, the
GAO has in the past asserted a selective right to review disputes decisions
deemed erroneous as a matter of law or otherwise failing to comply with

22. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). The Act provided that in addition
to the traditional grounds of fraud, a court could also reverse a disputes decision that
was "capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or ...
not supported by substantial evidence." 41 U.S.C. §321 (1970). It also added the proviso
that no disputes decision could be held "final on a question of law." 41 U.S.C. §322 (1970).
23. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 24.
24. See, e.g., 46 CoMp. GEN. 441 (1966); 42 Op. ATr'Y GEN. No. 33 (1969); Comment,
The Government's "Right of Appeal" from Adverse Decisions of the Board of Contract
Appeals, 22 BAYLOR L. REv. 191 (1970).

25. 406 U.S. 1, 19 (1972).
26. 373 US. 709 (1963).
27. Id. at 711-14.
28. United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc., 384 U.S. 424 (1966) (holding that
when the administrative record was incomplete the courts should remand the case to the
appeal board for further proceedings rather than make additional findings of their own);
United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966) (holding that factual
findings properly made under the disputes procedure were also binding on the court in an
independent action for breach of contract).
29. The only aspect of that role at issue in the instant case was GAO's authority to
review a decision rendered under the disputes procedure, an issue analyzed in Note, GAO
Review of Contract Appeal Board Decisions, 54 MINN. L. REV. 694 (1970); Comment, S. &
E. Contractors and the GAO Role in Government Contract Disputes: A Funny Thing
Happened on the Way to Finality, 55 VA. L. Ru". 762 (1969). The agency's entire role
in the procurement process is discussed in Cibinic & Lasken, The Comptroller General
and Government Contracts, 38 GEo. WASH. L. Ru". 349 (1970).
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Wunderlich Act standards.30 The legal issue posed by this assertion was
whether the statutorily defined powers of the agency or the provisions of the
Wunderlich Act were sufficient to justify an interference with the contractual rights of the parties implicitly created by the provisions of the disputes
clause. 31 By finding neither of the statutory authorities sufficient justification
for GAO's interference in the present case, 32 the Court thus eliminated a costly
contingency from the government procurement process and bolstered the
33
sagging credibility of the government contract.
Whether the Government, in fact, needs or deserves a right to appeal
disputes decisions rendered for the contractor hinges upon the subordinate
question of whether contract appeal boards actually function as agents of the
34
Government or as impartial and independent administrative tribunals. If
these final arbiters in the disputes determination process are properly characterized as agents of the Government, then the case for the government's
coordinate right to appeal is significantly diminished. To allow the Gov-

30. 46 COMP. GEN. 441 (1966). The Comptroller General there relied on the provisions
of 31 U.S.C. §§71, 74 (1970). Section 71 provides: "All claims and demands whatever by
the Government of the United States or against it, and all accounts whatever in which
the Government of the United States is concerned, either as debtor or creditor, shall be
settled and adjusted in the General Accounting Office." Section 74 adds in part: "Balances
certified by the General Accounting Office, upon the settlement of public accounts, shall
be final and conclusive upon the Executive Branch of the Government .... ." In the
instant case GAO asserted this right on behalf of the Government by utilizing the further
authority of 31 U.S.C. §82(d) (1970). That section provides, inter alia, that certifying
officers may be held liable for sums illegally paid, which liability they may avoid by
requesting (and subsequently honoring) advisory opinions from the Comptroller General
prior to certification of any questionable voucher. When in the instant case, the AEC
certifying officer requested such an opinion concerning a voucher for payment of one
part of the contractor's claim, GAO was then able to review the entire case and to obtain
compliance with its opinion by threatening to hold the certifying officer liable for any
payment made in disregard of its decision. See note 2 supra. For an example of GAO's
assertion of this right on behalf of a disgruntled contractor, see Op. COMP. GEN. B-156192
at 8 (unpub. Dec. 8, 1966) cited in 8 Gov'T CONTRACT REP. 82,526, at 88,048 (Feb. 7, 1969),
in which the Comptroller General attempted to remand the case to the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals. This was the famous Southside Plumbing case, which subsequently precipitated the Attorney's General's response in 42 Op. ATr'y GEN. No. 33 (1969)
(holding that GAO had no authority to remand to the ASBCA. The case was subsequently
settled while on appeal to the Court of Claims. However, the Attorney General's opinion
remains relevant to the instant case as the source of the Department of Justice's assertion
of a separate right to review contract appeal board decisions. That right was completely
rejected by the instant Court. 406 U.S. as 19.
31. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 7.
32. The Court felt the agency's statutorily defined powers were too general to support
the specific interference with contractual rights and it hesitated to construe the Wunderlich Act as conferring any such authority in light of the ambiguous legislative history
of the latter statute. 406 U.S. at 15-19. But see Justice Brennan's lengthy dissent maintaining
that the Wunderlich Congress clearly contemplated the limited role asserted by GAO in
the instant case. 406 U.S. at 23.
33. See Brief for ABA as Amicus Curiae at 18-80, Brief for Prof. Petrowitz as Amicus
Curiae at 4-15, S. & E. Contractors, Inc. v. United States 406 U.S. 1 (1972).
34. See Shedd, supra note 12, at 68.
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eminent to compel acceptance of the disputes clause procedure in lieu of
the contractor's common law rights and in addition to permit the Government
to assert an equal right to judicial review of the outcome of that procedure
would constitute a return to sovereign immunity abrogated by the Tucker
Act.3 5 The more equitable solution would be to require the Government to
decide whether its need for an uninterrupted performance from the contractor justified entrustment of its other interests in the contract to the sole
discretion of its agents. If it did not, then the rationale for retention of
the disputes procedure under the "agency theory" would be inapplicable
and both Government and contractor would profit from an initial resort
to the courts in the event of disputes. Conversely, should the Government
deem its need for uninterrupted performance paramount, a logical basis
would exist for retaining the disputes procedure even as it now exists with
the government's right of appeal severely restricted.
Nevertheless, some writers have asserted that the characterization of contract appeal boards as agents of the government agency they serve is misplaced, and that in actuality the boards function as impartial administrative
tribunals. 3 6 Were this characterization entirely correct little, if any, rational
basis would exist for allowing the contractor a right of appeal that is denied
the government. The fallacy in this characterization, however, is that the
boards remain the creatures of one of the parties to the contract regardless
of the standards that characterize their operation. 37 Thus, as recognized by
the instant Court it would make neither "good sense" nor "good law" to
allow the government a right of appeal from the decision of its own appointed
agents absent "clear congressional authorization."38
By basing its holding specifically on the provisions of the Wunderlich
Act, the present Court suggests that its decision is intended to preclude government appeals on issues of law as well as on issues of fact.3 9 Though
not surprising in the wake of the Utah Mining decision,40 this result serves
to reinstate the holding of Moorman with regard to disputed decisions in
favor of the contractor. 41 Likewise, when coupled with the present Court's
repudiation of the role asserted by GAO, it also serves to preclude GAO
from disallowing board awards in the future on the grounds they are ar4
roneous as a matter of law.

2

35. Tucker Act of 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.), allowed the Government to be sued on contract claims in either the Court of
Claims or the district courts. See Brief for ABA as Amicus-Curiae at 19-23.
36. 433 F.2d 1373, 1384-85 (Ct. Cl. 1970). See also Cuneo, Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals: Tyrant or Impartial Tribunal?, 39 A.B.A.J. 373 (1953); Hiestand &
Parler, The Disputes Procedure Under Government Contracts: The Role of the Appeal
Board and the Courts, 8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rxv. 1 (1966); Shedd, supra note 12, at
68-71.
37. 406 U.S. at 18, 19. Note the language of the disputes clause, note 7 supra.
38. Id. at 19-21 (concurring opinion).
39. Id. at 12-13.
40. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966); see note 28 supra.
41. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
42. An example of such legal challenge occurred in United States v. Mason & Hanger
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The Court was specific, however, in reserving to the government contract43
ing agency the right to petition for rehearing of an adverse board decision.
Furthermore, its language in this respect suggests that the agency could
refuse to pay an award of its own board, provided the refusal was timely,
and thereby force the contractor to bring suit. 44 This indirect means for ob-

taining judicial review was condoned by the Court of Claims in C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc. v. United States.4 5 Yet despite the supporting dicta in both

Langenfelder and the instant case, the question remains whether this indirect
procedure would be found valid under the contractual language of the
disputes clause. That language incorporating the provisions of the Wunderlich Act 4" could easily be construed to authorize a direct appeal from a final
disputes decision by either party to the contract.47 On the other hand, its
implicit characterization of the appeal board as the agent of the government
might be interpreted as precluding any actual repudiation of the board's
decision by the principal contracting agency, in which case the indirect means
employed in Langenfelder would constitute a breach of contract. 48 Further
refined, the issue becomes whether the courts will allow the contracting
agency to violate the implied terms of the contract in order to invoke a
contractual right that it is prevented by the exigencies of governmental
49
organization from invoking directly.
The impact of the instant decision also extends to practical problems
arising from the growing inefficiency of current public contract disputes
resolution procedures5 0 For example, a compelling fact in favor of the
Co., 260 U.S. 323 (1922), where the Supreme Court finally reinstated the contracting
officer's decision. See also James Graham Mfg. Co. v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 715 (N.D.
Cal. 1950); McShain Co. v. United States, 83 Ct. Cl. 405 (1936).
43. 406 U.S. at 18, 19.
44. Id. The specific language states: "This case does not involve the situation where
an administrative agency, upon . . . prompt sua sponte reconsideration, determines
that its earlier decision was wrong and . . . refuses to abide by it." See also the discussion
of the court below at 433 F.2d 1373, 1378, 1385 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
45. 196 Ct. Cl. 465 (1965). The court, however, actually declined to review the appeal
board decision because the contracting agency had delayed for a year before notifying
the contractor of its intention to challenge the award. See also J.L. Simmons Co. v.
United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 684 (1969); Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 171 Ct.
Cl. 251 (1965).
46. See note 7 supra. The section italicized is equivalent to the language in 41 U.S.C.
§321 (1970).
47. The essence of the instant decision was that government agencies not in privity
with the contractor had no right to challenge disputes decisions. Rather, for purposes of
the contract, the contracting agency was the only party on the Government side of the
contract.
48. See Comment, supra note 24, at 200; Comment, supra note 29, at 779 n.99.
49. The agency would not have standing in the courts to challenge a decision of
one of its own component bodies. Likewise, it could not proceed to court on its own
initiative, but would have to enlist the offices of the Department of Justice. See 42 Op.
A'-r'y GEN. 18, 19 (1969).
50. See discussions in Hearings on H.R. 474 Before the Subcom. on Government
Procurement and Contracting of the House Corn. on Government Operations, 91st Cong.,
ist Sess. (1969).
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contractor in the principal case was that long delays occurring in a procedure
designed to afford an efficient and inexpensive resolution of disputes proved
so costly as to destroy his business.51 In light of this evidence the instant
Court's restriction of the government's right to judicial review decreased
the expense of the disputes process so future contractors would not inflate
bids to cover such an expensive contingency.5 2 In actuality, however, this
anticipated savings in the costs of government procurement must be contrasted with the potential for increased costs inherent in a disputes procedure
weighted in favor of the contractor. 53 Furthermore, if the resulting contractor advantage is coupled with the traditional proclivity of government agents
to neglect their roles as protectors of the public purse, it appears equally
likely that the instant decision will prove extremely costly to the American
taxpayer.5 4
The possibility of this boomerang effect from a decision directed toward
fiscal efficiency indicates that the time is ripe for revamping the entire disputes resolution procedure. In recent years numerous proposals have been
developed for this purpose55 but as yet neither the executive branch nor
Congress has taken definite action.56 In the wake of the instant decision two
of these proposals appear preferable to the present procedure. One involves
adoption of arbitration proceedings in lieu of the present administrative
appeal boards. 57 The principal merits derived from this alternative are an
immediate resolution of disputes at relatively small expense plus a final
decision by an impartial arbiter from which neither party would need a
right of appeal.5 8 Its liabilities involve those typically listed for arbitrationinconsistency of results, no predictable decisional law to reduce the number
of future disputes, and a hesitancy to invest an informal procedure with
finality in the settlement of public debts.59 The other viable alternative is
to allow the contractor to appeal an adverse decision of the contracting
officer either to the administrative board of contract appeals or directly to
the courts. 60 This alternative would allow the contractor more freedom to

51.

Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 15.

52. 406 U.S. at 14 n.10.
53. See King & Little, Critique of Public Construction Contract Remedies with Recommended Changes, 5 PuB. CoNT. L.J. 1, 8-17 (1972).
54. Id. at 9, 17.
55. See, e.g., King & Little, supra note 53; Spector, supra note 11; Note, Government
Contracts Disputes: An InstitutionalApproach, 73 YALE L.J. 1408 (1964).
56. However, the Congress has established a Commission on Government Procurement

whose report is forthcoming.
57. See Katzman, Arbitration in Government Contracts: The Ghost at the Banquet,
24 ARB. J. 133 (1969); King & Little, supra note 53, at 12.
58. King & Little, supra note 53, at 12-14.

59. Id.
60. See Spector, supra note 11, at 11.
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